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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROYAL STREET LAND COMPANY,
A Utah corporation,
Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 19480

WILLIAM J. REED and
PATSY REED,
Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by appellant Royal Street Land
Company ("Royal Street") pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§§ 78-40-1 to -13 (1977) to quiet title to the surface rights
in a certain parcel of land located on Deer Valley Road in
Park City, Utah.

R. 1-2.

Respondents William J. Reed and

Patsy Reed (the "Reeds") answered claiming title to the property by adverse possession under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-7 to
-15 (1977) and asserting that, in any event, Royal Street's
action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations,
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-5 (1977). "R. 19-20.
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I

DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson granted summary judgment in
favor of the Reeds and, on September 12, 1983, signed a judgment quieting title in the Reeds to the surface rights in the
property,

R. 358-59.
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

On appeal, the Reeds seek to affirm the summary judgment
entered by the district court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action involves a rectangular parcel of land encompassing approximately two-thirds of an acre on Deer Valley
Road in Park City, Utah.

The property is located in a resi-

dential area on one of the many patented mining claims in
Park City.

A home, built in the 1920s, is situated on

approximately the center of the property, and a double garage
is located on a rear corner.

The home is surrounded by a

lawn and by various shrubs, bushes and gardens, all of which
the Reeds maintain.

The Reeds have expended years of per-

sonal effort and substantial sums of money on improving and
caring for the home and surrounding property.

R. 106-111.

In contrast, Royal Street and its predecessors have had such
remote contact with the property that, for over fifty years,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-2-

{

they remained unaware that a house had been built and that
the property was being used as a residence.

R. 27.

This is an appeal from summary judgment, so the facts as
reflected in the district court record are crucial. The
issue on appeal is a narrow one: whether Royal Street's (and
its predecessors') payment of the $5.00 per acre tax imposed
by Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-57 (1973) on "mines and mining
claims" prevents the Reeds from acquiring title to the surface estate by adverse possession.

The Reeds dispute Royal

Street's statement of facts to the extent it implicitly
raises factual questions which were undisputed in the court
below.

Thus, the Reeds present the following account of the

undisputed facts to demonstrate the narrowness of the issue
around which the case revolves.
It was undisputed in the district court that Royal Street
holds the record title to the surface of the property, but
that the Reeds and their predecessors have been in exclusive,
open, notorious and continuous possession of the surface
estate and its improvements for over fifty years.

In addi-

tion, it was undisputed that the Reeds have paid all taxes
being assessed against the property or its improvements of
which they were aware, and that they have met all of the
other statutory requirements for adverse possession.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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They

entered possession under claim of title founded upon a written instrument, have been in continuous, open and notorious
possession since that time, either in person or through
lessees, and have cultivated and improved the property, which
has been substantially enclosed.
§§ 78-12-7 to -14 (1977).

See Utah Code Ann.

Certainly, 50 years of residential

use could not have been mistaken for an occasional trespass,
and Royal Street has disputed neither the conclusion nor the
facts supporting the conclusion that those statutory requirements have been met.
Royal Street's record title to the surface estate originates in mining patents issued by the United States.

The

property is part of 40 acres to which Royal Street has
received record title following various conveyances stemming
from the patents to the mining claims.

Record title to the

underlying mineral rights is owned by United Park City Mines
Company, Royal Street's predecessor.
The Reeds' predecessors first occupied the property in
the 1920s.

In 1928 or 1929, William Lawry, a shift boss for

Park Utah Consolidated Mine Company, built a house and double
garage which are still located on the property, and which
serve as the Reeds' residence.

R. 155. Mr. Lawry built

fences on the east and west boundaries of the property,
extending from a roadway on the south to a railroad track

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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near and parallelling the present road on the north side of
the property.

The west side fence was later replaced with

railroad ties.

Those railroad ties, along with the east

fence line and the north and south roadways, still exist on
the property today.

R. 155.

In 1946, Mr. Lawry and his wife quitclaimed the house and
other improvements on the property to Ray Pedersen.

R. 161.

Mr. Pedersen died in 1954. R. 158. After his death, his
wife Edythe, in order to establish ownership rights to the
house and improvements, paid past due taxes at a tax sale and
received title by quitclaim deed from Summit County in 1955.
R. 158-162.

In order to further establish her rights to the

house and the property surrounding the house, Mrs. Pedersen
executed and recorded a document entitled "Declaration of
Homestead" dated November 2, 1956.

R. 158, 163-64.

Until

she quitclaimed the property to the Reeds, she claimed the
exclusive right to possession of the property and intended to
exclude all others from any interest in the property except
with her permission.

R. 159-160.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In August, 1962, Mrs. Pedersen (then named Rasband) sold
the land and improvements thereon to the Reeds.

R. 165.

The quitclaim deed from Mrs. Rasband under which the Reeds
came into possession described the property conveyed as:
House No. 570, with double garage, being the ninth
(9th) house on the rear, South side of Deer Valley,
Park City, Utah, including all land surrounding the
house between the lateral fence lines and extending
from the road in front to the road in rear.
R. 107, 113. Since obtaining the property from Mrs. Rasband,
the Reeds have continuously occupied and maintained the property as their principal residence, except for periods from
1967 to 1973 and from 1978 to 1979, when they leased the
house to tenants who occupied the property.

R. 109.

The

Reeds have expended over $20,000 on improvements to the house
and the property, including landscaping, gardening, extensive
remodeling of the house, addition of 60 to 70 feet of cement

lln its brief, Royal Street alleges that the Reeds gave
only nominal consideration for the property. Appellant's
Brief pp. 15-16. That allegation was not raised in the lower
court, so the record contains no contrary evidence. Nevertheless, the court may be assured that the Reeds paid a substantial sum for the property in 1962. The quitclaim deed's
recital of $10 consideration, R. 113, merely reflects the
uniform practice of stating only nominal consideration in
deeds. The court may take note that Royal Street's deed to
the property also recites only nominal consideration.
R. 224-27.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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sidewalk on the property and replacement of water lines on
the property.

R. 57-58f 110-111.

In 1973, the Reeds quitclaimed the property to themselves
in order to establish a metes and bounds legal description of
the property.

R. 108. While the legal description was later

found to be erroneous, the 1973 quitclaim deed incorporated
by reference the terms of the 1962 deed from Mrs. Rasband and
the 1956 Declaration of Homestead.

R. 114-16.

The Reeds1

possession and right to possession of the property remained
undisputed until October 23, 1979, when this suit was filed,
and they have always considered themselves to be the rightful
owners of the property.

R. 108-110.

The only dispute in this case is whether the Reeds have
legally satisfied the requirement under Utah law that claimants to title by adverse possession pay the taxes assessed on
the property during the adverse possession period.

Since

they entered into possession of the property in 1962, the
Reeds have paid all taxes assessed against the property or
its improvements of which they were aware.

Prior to 1973,

the Reeds and their predecessors paid taxes on the property
described as "9th House S Side Deer Valley PC House #570 with
double garage."

R. 110.

In 1973, following the Reeds1 con-

veyance of the property to themselves under a metes and
bounds legal description, the tax notices were changed to

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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describe the property by the metes and bounds description.
The Reeds have paid taxes on that description from 1973 to
the present.

R. 111.

In fact, Royal Street commenced its

quiet title action against the Reeds approximately one week
prior to the tax assessment date for the seventh year of
taxes under that description.

R. 4 f 63.

The only tax involving the property that the Reeds have
not paid is the mining claim tax set forth in Utah Code Ann.
§ 59-5-57 (1973).

That tax is levied on the mine or mining

claim at the rate of $5.00 per acre, plus an adjustment based
on gross revenues, if any.

From 1939 to 1977, that tax was

levied on the forty acre tract of mining claims now owned by
Royal Street and United Park City Mines Company, which
includes the 2/3 acre occupied and claimed by the Reeds, and
was assessed to Royal Street or its predecessors in interest.

In 1977 or 1978, because of the separation of record

title to the surface and mineral estates in those forty acres
occasioned by the 1975 conveyance, the State Tax Commission
referred the surface rights in the mining claims to Summit
County for separate assessment.

In 1980, after this action

was commenced, Summit County separately assessed the surface
rights in the forty acre tract to Royal Street for 1980 and
for 1977 through 1979 in arrears." R. 76.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
It is the Reeds1 position that, under controlling Utah
case lawf they acquired ownership of the surface rights in
the property prior to 1973 by virtue of their satisfaction of
the statutory requirements for adverse possession and in
spite of the payment of the $5.00 per acre tax on the mining
claims by Royal Street and its predecessors.

When the sur-

face of a mining claim is unimproved, the mining claim tax
may well include surface rights.

As soon as the surface is

used for non-mining purposes, however, Utah law requires
separate assessment of the surface and mineral estates, and
applies the mining claim tax only to the underlying mineral
rights.
In the case at bar, non-mining use of the surface began
in the 1920s when Mr. Lawry moved onto the property, constructed a house and occupied it as a residence.

Under Utah

law, adverse possessors must pay all taxes assessed against
the interest they claim.

In the case at bar, the Reeds claim

only the surface rights to the property and make no claim to
the underlying mieral estate.

Because the required separate

assessment of the surface rights was not made until 1980, no
tax was lawfully assessed against-the surface for over fifty
years and the Reeds acquired ownership of the surface by

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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adverse possession.

In addition, the Reeds assert that Royal

Street's action is barred by the statute of limitations.
POINT I

A.

<

PRIOR TO 197 3, NO TAXES WERE LAWFULLY
ASSESSED AGAINST THE SURFACE ESTATE OF THE
PROPERTY AND THE REEDS ARE THEREFORE
ENTITLED TO OWNERSHIP THROUGH ADVERSE
POSSESSION WITHOUT PAYMENT OF TAXES.
Where No Taxes Are Legally Assessed, Title Can Be
Acquired Through Adverse Possession Without Payment
of Taxes.

In order to establish title by adverse possession, Utah
law requires that, during the seven years of continuous possession relied upon for adverse possession, the possessing
party "must have paid all taxes which have been levied and
assessed upon such land according to law."
§ 78-12-12 (1977).

Utah Code Ann.

The law in Utah is well settled, however,

that where rvo taxes are lawfully assessed, title by adverse
possession may be acquired without payment of taxes.

Farrer

v. Johnson, 2 Utah 2d 189, 271 P.2d 462, 466 (1954).

As will

be shown below, the $5.00 mining claim tax paid by Royal
Street could not lawfully include the surface rights to the
property after non-mining use of the surface began in the
1920s.

Therefore, because the Reeds have paid all taxes law-

fully assessed on the surface, they are entitled to ownership
by adverse possession.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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<

B#

The Collateral Issues Royal Street Raises Involving
the Assessment of the Taxes Paid by the Reeds Are
Irrelevant.

In its brief, Royal Street raises the issues of whether
the assessment under which the Reeds paid taxes prior to 1973
included the surface or only the improvements on the surface
of the property, and of whether, beginning in 1973, the
assessment of taxes under an erroneous legal description
operated to invalidate those taxes.
6-7, 14, 17-18, 39-40.

Appellant's Brief pp.

Royal Street's assertion is that,

because of those alleged defects, the taxes so assessed were
not assessed against the realty in issue and that therefore,
the Reeds paid no taxes on the property.

Based on that

assertion, Royal Street concludes that the Reeds did not
satisfy the payment of taxes requirement of Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-12-12 (1977).
Royal Street's focus is misplaced in two respects.
First, while the erroneous property description contained in
the post-1973 tax notices may raise a question concerning the
lawfulness of the taxes so assessed, resolution of that question has no impact on the outcome of this case.

It is undis-

puted that no other tax, except the mining claim tax, was
assessed involving the property, and that the Reeds therefore
paid all taxes lawfully assessed.-

In addition, it is not

disputed that the Reeds paid the post-1973 taxes for one year
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less than the requisite seven years before commencement of
this action.

Finally, it is undisputed that the Reeds began

paying the pre-1973 taxes in 1962. Because the Reeds paid
the pre-1973 taxes for over seven years, any rights the Reeds
have acquired by adverse possession would have been acquired
before 1973.

Therefore, the error in the post-1973 property

description is not relevant.

In any event, the 1973 deed

also referred to the descriptions in prior conveyances, R.
114, and the parties stipulated in the district court that
the legal description was intended to describe the same property.

R. 347-52.

Second, Royal Street's assertion that the pre-1973 taxes
only included improvements on the surface, and its concomitant questioning of whether the Reeds paid any tax on the
surface rights, is misplaced.

The proper focus is on whether

any taxes were validly assessed on the property which the
Reeds did not pay, rather than on whether the Reeds paid any
taxes on the property.

It is undisputed that both the pre-

1973 taxes and the post-1973 taxes, valid or not, were paid
by the Reeds and that no other taxes, except the $5.00 per
acre mining claim tax, were assessed involving the property
during the critical period.

If the pre- and post-1973 taxes

were lawfully assessed, the Reeds paid them.

If the taxes

were not lawfully assessed, the Reeds were not required to
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Utah Const. Art. XIII § 4 (emphasis added).

Under the

Constitution, separate assessment and taxation of the surface
of the property are required once the surface acquires an
identity separate from the mining claim.
Pursuant to the Constitutional requirement, the taxation
statute first requires assessment of the mine or mining claim
itself, without reference to the accompanying surface rights:
All metalliferous mines and mining claims, both
placer and rock in place, shall be assessed at $5.00
per acre and in addition thereto at a value equal to
two times the average net annual proceeds thereof
for the three calendar years next preceding or for
as many calendar years next preceding that the mine
has been operating, whichever is less . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-57 (1973).2

Second, the statute

requires assessment of mining machinery, surface improvements
and any non-mining use being made of the surface:
All machinery used in mining and all property or
surface improvements upon or appurtenant to mines or
mining claims and the value of any surface use made
of mining claims or mining property for other than
mining purposes shall be assessed at 30% of their
reasonable fair cash value.
3
Id.
(emphasis added).

2A 1981 amendment increased the $5.00 figure to
$10.00. See Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-57 (Supp. 1983).
3

A 1981 amendment decreased the 30% figure to 20%. See
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-57 (Supp. 1983).
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The statutory language is not permissive; rather, it
requires that non-mining use of the surface be separately
assessed, and thus demonstrates that the $5.00 per acre tax
was intended only as a minimum tax on dormant mining claims.
Utah Copper Co. v. Chandler, 45 Utah 85, 142 P. 1119, 1120
(1914) (discussed in detail below).

For purposes of that

minimum tax, the "mining claim" includes both surface and
mineral rights only while the surface of the mining claim
remains unimproved or is used for mining purposes, because,
until some separate use occurs, the surface has no identity
separate from the mining claim.

As soon as the surface of

the claim is used for other than mining purposes, however,
the surface acquires a separate identity, and the statute and
Constitution require that the surface be separately assessed
by the State Tax Commission or the appropriate county.

At

that point, the minimum assessment of $5.00 per acre becomes
applicable only to the mineral rights underlying the property.

That rule applies regardless of whether the surface is

occupied by the record owner or someone other than the record
owner; the character of the use itself is determinative.
Thus, once a non-mining use of the surface of the claim
occurs, the question of whether the $5.00 minimum tax on
unimproved claims was intended to* include the surface rights
becomes irrelevant.

In the case at bar, that event occurred
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in the 1920s, when William Lawry began using the surface as
his residence.

At that point, the surface acquired an iden-

tity separate and apart from the mining claim, triggering the
statutory provision requiring separate assessment of the mining claim and the surface use.

Because the required separate

assessment was never made, no tax, other than any tax paid by
the Reeds or their predecessors, was lawfully imposed on the
surface during the adverse possession period, and the Reeds
are entitled to ownership of the surface rights through
adverse possession without payment of the tax imposed on the
mining claim.

See Farrer v. Johnson, 2 Utah 2d 189, 271 P.2d

462, 466 (1954) .
D.

Under Controlling Utah Case Law, Royal Street's
Payment of the $5.00 Minimum Tax on Mining Claims
Does Not Prevent the Reeds from Obtaining Title by
Adverse Possession.

It has been the settled law of Utah for over 70 years
that a patented mining claim owner's payment of the $5.00 per
acre minimum tax imposed by Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-57 (1973)
and its predecessors does not preclude persons who have
otherwise fulfilled the statutory adverse possession requirements from obtaining title to the surface of the claim by
adverse possession.

The landmark Utah case on the subject,

Utah Copper Co. v. Chandler, 45 Utah 85, 142 P. 1119 (1914),

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-16-

involved controlling facts identical to those presented in
the case at bar.
In Chandlery the record owner of a mining claim sought to
quiet title to the surface of the claim against two defendants who had built a home and a hall on the claim and who
claimed title by adverse possession.

It was agreed that the

defendants had paid all taxes separately assessed against the
surface lots they claimed, and that the tax on the mining
claim assessed at $5.00 per acre in accordance with Utah
Revised Statutes § 2504 (1898 as amended), a statute essentially identical to Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-57 (1973) , had been
paid by the plaintiff.

Thus, the case turned on the same

issue as the case at bar: whether, after non-mining use of
the surface had occurred, payment of the $5.00 per acre minimum tax by the record owner of the mining claim precluded
acquisition of title by adverse possession.

This court,

reasoning that the statute required separate assessment of
the mining claim and the surface rights once a non-mining
surface use had begun, held that the $5.00 tax applied only
to the mineral rights and that the defendants were therefore
entitled to ownership of the surface estate by adverse possession.
Chandler was, as Royal Street asserts, decided on an
agreed statement of facts, but the agreement did not render
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unnecessary the court's resolution of the effect of the mining claim tax*

The parties agreed (1) that the record owner

had paid the mining tax, (2) that the claimants had paid all
other taxes, although there was an issue concerning whether
those taxes had been validly assessed, and (3) that, if the
taxes paid by the claimants were valid, the taxes were deemed
to be cumulative and any legal rights arising out of a double
assessment of tax were waived.

142 P. at 1119-20. This

court held in favor of the claimants on alternative grounds:
(1) If the taxes paid by the claimants were validly assessed,
they were entitled to ownership of the surface rights by virtue of their payment of those taxes, and (2) if the taxes
paid by the claimants were not validly assessed, then no
taxes were validly assessed on the surface rights and the
claimants were entitled to ownership without payment of
taxes.

142 P. at 1120.

This court's conclusion that payment of the mining tax by
the record owner did not preclude the claimants' right to
adverse possession was essential to its ruling in Chandler.
Had the court found payment of the mining tax sufficient to
overcome the adverse possession claim to the surface rights,
it could not have held for the claimants, because it was
agreed that the record owner, and not the claimants, had paid
the mining tax.

142 P. at 1119.

Under the court's first
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alternative, that the taxes paid by the claimants were lawfully assessed and paid, the agreed fact statement would have
the effect of waiving the claim that the mining tax also
included the surface, because the taxes paid by the claimants
did in fact purport to include the surface.

Thus, under the

first alternative, the agreement that taxes were not cumulative would have eliminated from consideration the issues surrounding the applicability of the $5.00 tax to the surface of
the claim.
Under the court's second alternative, that the taxes were
invalid, however, the agreement over the cumulative effect of
double assessments could have no impact, because the surface
was not otherwise assessed and by definition no double
assessment could exist.

In that framework, the question

concerning the applicability of the mining tax to the surface
was squarely presented.

Thus, the finding that the mining

tax does not apply to the surface rights where the surface is
used for "other than mining purposes" was necessary to the
court's resolution of the second alternative.

The agreed

statement of facts under which the case was decided cannot
defeat that conclusion.
One year after Chandler, in Utah Copper Co. v. Eckman, 47
Utah 165, 152 P. 178 (1915), this* court reaffirmed the
Chandler holding:
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Under the [taxation] statute, if a person is in
actual and adverse possession of the surface ground
of a mining claim for the period of time required by
our statute, and has, during that time, improved the
surface under a claim of right, such person may be
assessed with such surface area and the improvements
thereon, and . . . may pay the taxes so assessed,
and such payment will be sufficient to entitle him
to make a claim of adverse possession to such surface ground, together with the improvements thereon,
as against the owner of the mining claim, although
the latter may also have paid the taxes on the mining claim as such and in accordance with the fixed
statutory evaluation aforesaid, and may claim all
the minerals beneath the surface.
152 P. at 180.

Eckman involved facts essentially the same as

Chandler, but this court found the record to be inadequate to
determine whether the record owner had been assessed only the
$5.00 per acre minimum tax, or whether it had also been
assessed separately for surface improvements.

If the record

owner had also been assessed separately for surface improvements, a double assessment would exist and Chandler would not
apply.

Thus, the court remanded the case for further factual

findings.

In the case at bar, however, it is undisputed that

Royal Street was assessed only the minimum tax, and was
assessed no separate tax upon the surface use or improvements
until after this action was commmenced.
Whether the statute requires separate assessment of the
mineral and surface rights is a legal, not factual, question.

Chandler and Eckman are dispositive:

the Reeds are

entitled to ownership by adverse possession despite Royal
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Street's payment of the $5.00 per acre mining claim tax.

To

hold otherwise would require that both Chandler and Eckman be
overruled.
E.

The Cases Royal Street Cites to Distinguish Chandler
and Eckman are Inapplicable.

Royal Street cites several cases in an attempt to explain
away Chandler and Eckman.

Those cases, however, if applica-

ble at all, are applicable only by analogy, and should not be
followed in the face of better controlling authority.

Royal

Street cites Aggelos v. Zella Mining Co., 99 Utah 417, 107
P.2d 170 (1940), for the court's finding therein that
Chandler and Eckman were not dispositive of that case.
Appellant's Brief pp. 30-31.

It is clear from the case and

from Royal Street's quotation of the case, however, that the
court did not reject Chandler and Eckman on their merits.
Instead, the court held that the question of the effect of
the mining tax had not been reached because, although Salt
Lake County had been assessing taxes on the property since
1927, the claimant had paid those taxes for only four years
prior to commencement of the action in 1937.
171.

107 P.2d at

The court held that the claimant's purchase of the

property under a tax deed from the county in 1936 did not
constitute a payment of taxes, and thus, that the claimant
had failed to pay the taxes actually assessed against the
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interest he was claiming for the required seven-year period.
107 P.2d at 171-72.

Thus the court merely held that Chandler

and Eckman did not fit in the circumstances; the dictum cited
by Royal Street reflects little if any consideration of those
cases.

It should be noted that in the instant case, the

Reeds have paid all taxes separately assessed against the
surface interest they claim.
Royal Street's citation of Rio Grande W. Ry. v. Salt Lake
Inv. Co., 35 Utah 528, 101 P. 586 (1909), is similarly inapposite.

In that case, the railway claimed title by adverse

possession, asserting that it had listed the land in question
with the State Board of Equalization, which had exclusive
statutory authority to tax railway property, and had paid all
taxes so assessed.

The record owner, however, had continued

to pay taxes assessed on the property by the Salt Lake County
Assessor.

The court held that, because the railway did not

own the property when it listed it with the Board of
Equalization, the property was not "railway property" and
thus the Board had no jurisdiction to tax the property.
Thus, the only tax "lawfully assessed" on the property was
that assessed by the county.

Because the railway had not

paid the county tax, the court held that it had not satisfied
the statutory requirements.
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Royal Street's analogy of the present case to the Rio
Grande case is flawed in several respects.

First, Rio Grande

turned on the court's express finding that the property
involved had not been used for railway purposes, 101 P.2d at
591, and thus was not subject to the jurisdiction of the
Board of Equalization,

Furthermore, in Rio Grande, a proper

filing was necessary to trigger a change in taxation; in the
case at bar, the operation of the statute is automatic.

Most

importantly, however, the outcome of the case at bar hinges
on whether the statute requires or merely permits separate
taxation of non-mining surface activities.
turns on unique statutory language.

Thus, the case

In asserting, based on

Rio Grande, that the Reeds' unilateral occupation of the surface could not by itself trigger separate taxation of the
surface, Royal Street assumes the very conclusions it seeks
to establish: that the $5.00 minimum tax includes surface
rights and that the statute does not automatically require
separate taxation of non-mining uses.
F.

Public Policy Supports the District Court's Grant of
Title to the Reeds by Adverse Possession.

"Adverse possession" functions as a method of
transferring interests in land without the consent
of the prior owner, and even in spite of the dissent
of such owner. It rests upon^social judgments that
there should be a restricted duration for the assertion of "aging claims," and that the elapse of a
reasonable time should assure security to a person
claiming to be an owner.
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R. Powell & P. Rohan, The Law of Real Property 1[ 1012 [2] at
91-4 (1982).

Public policy demands that persons who have

improved and made beneficial use of a piece of property for
over 50 years be favored over those whose contact with the
property was so far removed that they were apparently not
even aware of the long-time residential use.

R. 27. Those

facts, coupled with Royal Street's use of tenuous analogies
and sophisticated distinctions to overcome explicitly stated
rules of longstanding property lawf demonstrate for the court
the weakness of Royal Street's position.

The district

court's granting of title to the Reeds by adverse possession
must be upheld.
POINT II
ROYAL STREET'S ACTION TO RECOVER POSSESSION
IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
A.

The Express Provisions of the Statute of Limitations
Bars Royal Street's Action.

The Reeds have established their title to the property by
adverse possession under the controlling authorities discussed above.

In additionf however, Royal Street's action to

challenge the Reeds' title by adverse possession is barred by
the seven year statute of limitations:
No action for the recovery of real property or
for the possession thereof shall be maintained,
unless it appears that the plaintiff, his ancestor,
grantor or predecessor was seized or possessed of
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the property in question within seven years before
the commencement of the action•
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-5 (1977).

In this casef it is undis-

puted that the Reeds and their predecessors were in actual
possession of the property in question for over 50 years
prior to commencement of this suit, and that at no time
during that period was Royal Street in actual possession.
R. 155-56, 196-98.

Under the express provisions of the stat-

ute. Royal Street was not "seized or possessed" of the property within the seven year period, and thus is barred from
asserting title thereto.
Royal Street argues that, by virtue of its record ownership, it was "seized" of the property within the meaning of
the statute.

In so arguing, Royal Street ignores the fact

that the Reeds were also "seized" of the property and assumes
that its constructive seisin can overcome the Reeds1 actual
seisin.

In essence, Royal Street's argument is that the

statute of limitations cannot operate against record owners
because record owners are always constructively "seized or
possessed" of their property.

Analysis of the statute of

limitations in context, however, reveals that it was intended
to operate against record owners and that adoption of Royal
Street's interpretation would render meaningless several
related provisions of the Code.
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B.

Royal Street's Interpretation of the Statute of
Limitations Would Render Several Other Statutory
Provisions Superfluous.

The statute of limitations is part of a broader statutory
scheme which seeks to protect from attack the interests of
those who, under some claim of right, have been in continuous
possession of property over an extended period of time.

At

the same time, the statutory scheme recognizes the special
interests of record owners, protecting those interests with
evidentiary presumptions which can only be rebutted upon a
special showing by the person in possession:
In every action for the recovery of real property, or the possession thereof, the person establishing a legal title to the property shall be presumed to have been possessed thereof within the time
required by law; and the occupation of the property
by any other person shall be deemed to have been
under and in subordination to the legal title,
unless it appears that the property has been held
and possessed adversely to such legal title for
seven years before the commencement of the action.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-7 (1977).

If Royal Street were

correct in arguing that the term "seized" in the statute of
limitations refers to constructive possession, the
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presumption of possession provided in Section 78-12-7 as a
protection for record owners would be rendered superfluous.

4

The Reeds Have Rebutted Royal Streetfs Presumption
of Possession by Holding the Property "Adversely"
Within the Meaning of the Statute of Limitations.

C.

The Legislature, recognizing the applicability of the
statute of limitations to actions by record owners, required
the person in possession to rebut the presumption that the
record owner is in possession with a special showing that the
property "has been held or possessed adversely to such legal
title for seven years before the commencement of the
action."

Royal Street argues, based on the phrase "possessed

adversely" in the statute, that the presumption of possession
can only be overcome by a showing of title by adverse possession.

In so arguing, Royal Street tacitly admits that the

statute of limitations operates against record owners.

4

The requirement of the tax title statute of limitations, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-5.1 (1977), that the record
owner must show actual possession to defeat a tax title,
should be interpreted as directed at the presumption created
by the constructive possession statute, Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-12-7 (1977), rather than at the broad interpretation of
the word "seisin" proposed by Royal Street.
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In any event, the Code does not provide that a showing of
title by adverse possession is required to overcome the presumption; rather, it requires a showing that the property has
been "held and possessed adversely."

{

The Code's specific

definition of the elements of such a showing conclusively
refutes Royal Street's assertion that a showing of title by

t

adverse possession is required:
Whenever it appears that the occupant, or those
under whom he claims, entered into possession of the
property under claim of title, exclusive of other
right, founding such claim upon a written instrument
as being a conveyance of the property in question,
or upon the decree or judgment of a competent court,
and there has been a continued occupation and possession of the property included in such instrument,
decree or judgment, or of some part of the property
under such claim, for seven years, the property so
included is deemed to have been held adversely,
except that when the property so included consists
of a tract divided into lots, the possession of one
lot is not deemed a possession of any other lot of
the same tract.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-8 (1977) (emphasis added).

<

{

<

The stat-

ute contains no requirement that taxes be paid.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the Reeds

\

entered into possession under a claim of title founded upon a
written instrument (the deed from Edythe Rasband).

R. 197.

It is undisputed that the Reeds have continuously occupied

<

the premises under that instrument, either in person or
through tenants, for substantially in excess of seven years.
R. 109.

It is undisputed that at no time was Royal Street in

actual possession.

R. 155-56, 196-98.

Thus, the property
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<

has been "held and possessed adversely" within the meaning of
the statute, and the Reeds are entitled to judgment dismissing Royal Street's complaint.
D.

Other Considerations Refute Royal Street's Interpretation of the Statute of Limitations.

While Royal Street is precluded from asserting its record
ownership regardless of whether the district court is upheld
on adverse possession or statute of limitations grounds, the
two theories are nevertheless not alternative routes to the
same conclusion.

The statute of limitations imposes limited

requirements and grants a limited remedy, merely shielding
the instrument under which possession is claimed from
attack.

The adverse possession statute, on the other hand,

imposes more stringent requirements and grants a broader
remedy —

a new title which forecloses all interests to which

possession was adverse, including equitable interests.

See

Frederiksen v. LaFleur, 632 P.2d 827, 830 (Utah 1981); 1983
Utah L. Rev. 256, 259.
The Reeds' approach avoids the problems of statutory
interpretation inherent in Royal Street's analysis, and preserves the meaningfulness of the statutes safeguarding the
special interests of record owners.

In addition, it pre-

serves the distinctions between the statutory remedies
involved.

The actual, open and adverse use of the property

by the Reeds and their predecessors for over 50 years, and
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the concomitant failure of Royal Street or its predecessors
to assert any rights to the property during that time,
require at minimum that this court hold Royal Street's action
to be barred by the statute of limitations.
POINT III
IT IS UNNECESSARY TO REMAND THE CASE TO
ALLOW THE DISTRICT COURT TO ADDRESS THE
REMAINING ISSUES RAISED BY ROYAL STREET.
A.

'

The Issue of Whether or Not the Tax Notices Under
Which the Reeds Paid Taxes Adequately Described the
Property is Irrelevant.

Royal Street asserts that "the District Court never
really confronted the fact that the Reeds have not paid any
taxes on the property that they actually claimedf" relying
upon the misdescription of the property contained in the tax
notices.

Appellant's Brief, p. 40.

The Reeds, however,

pointed that issue out to the court in their original briefing of the summary judgment motion, R. 172, and it was raised
numerous times thereafter.

R. 324-25, 329, 332, 347-52.

Prior to the court's signing its judgment, the parties stipulated and the court ordered that the correct legal description should be substituted for the erroneous description.
347-52.

R.

Clearly, the district court was apprised of and con-

sidered the situation.

<
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In any event, as pointed out earlier in this brieff the
issue Royal Street raises is irrelevant.
11-13.

See supra pp.

The Reeds paid taxes under the erroneous legal

description for about one week less than seven years prior to
filing of this action, and so cannot and do not rely only on
payment of those taxes for their adverse possession claim.
In addition, it is conceded that Royal Street paid only the
$5.00 mining claim tax, and that the only other taxes even
purporting to involve the property were paid by the Reeds.
Even if the taxes the Reeds paid were not correctly assessed,
no other taxes were assessed, and the Reeds were therefore
not required to pay taxes in order to acquire title by
adverse possession.
P.2d 462 (1954).

Farrer v. Johnson, 2 Utah 2d 189, 271

The validity of the taxes assessed under

the erroneous property description can have no impact on the
outcome of this case.
B.

The Purported Dedication of Roadway to Park City Is
Not Properly Contained in the Record and in Any
Event Does Not Affect the Outcome.

Royal Street asserts that the judgment quieting title in
the Reeds should be reversed, and the case remanded, so that
the district court may address Royal Street's purported dedication of a portion of the property to Park City in 1979 as
part of the Deer Valley Ski Resort access road.
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Royal

1

Street's argument must be rejected on several grounds.
First, there is no competent evidence in the record supporting Royal Street's assertion; the record reflects the assertion only in unsworn statements of counsel.

R. 338-39.

As

this is an appeal from summary judgment, the record is
crucial, and Royal Street's failure to properly raise the
issue in the record is fatal.
In addition, Royal Street admits that the purported dedication of roadway occurred prior to the filing of its complaint in 1979, R. 343, yet Royal Street failed to raise the
question until after summary judgment had been granted.

The

district court granted summary judgment on November 19,
1982.

R. 307. On July 25, 1983, Royal Street stipulated to

the revised property description contained in the court's
final order without raising the question of the alleged dedication.

R. 350.

It was not until after it had so stipulated

that Royal Street raised the question of dedication of the
roadway.

R. 342-44.

Royal Street should not be allowed to

overturn an adverse judgment simply by virtue of its own
failure to timely reveal facts, arising out of its own
actions, of which it knew or should have known even prior to

(

filing its complaint.
Even if the record were sufficient to raise the issue of
dedication, however, that issue has no bearing on the outcome
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{

of the case.

The adverse possession by the Reeds and their

predecessors divested Royal Street and its predecessors of
record title many years prior to the purported dedication.
Even if the dedication issue remains, however, Park City was
not an indispensible party to the quiet title action.

Any

rights Park City may have derived to the property through
Royal Street can still be determined in a separate action.
Under the quiet title sections of the Code, the rights of
persons who are not made parties to a quiet title action,
either by actual service or service by publication, are not
affected by the judgment rendered in such action.
Ann. § 78-40-12 (1977).

Utah Code

Thus, Park City remains free to

assert any rights arising out of the purported dedication,
and does not stand in the way of affirmance of the district
court's judgment in favor of the Reeds.
CONCLUSION
The Reeds and their predecessors have exclusively occupied and possessed the real property and improvements in dispute in this matter since the 1920s.

The property has been

substantially enclosed and the Reeds have expended substantial money and effort on its cultivation and improvement.
Royal Street's only claim to the property is its payment of
the $5.00 per acre annual tax on the mining claim underlying
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the property, which encompasses less than two-thirds of an
acre.

Since approximately 1928f the property has been used

for residential purposes by other than its record owners
without anyone questioning or disputing the Reeds1 or their
predecessors' right to do so.

Royal Street and its predeces-

sors remained unaware of the extensive, open and notorious
use of the property for over fifty years.
Under such circumstances, the Utah Constitution and taxation statutes require that the surface of the property be
separately assessed to reflect its non-mining residential
use.

As this was not done, no lawful taxes, other than taxes

paid by the Reeds and their predecessors, were assessed
against the surface of the subject property.

The $5.00 mini-

mum tax paid by Royal Street and its predecessors under the
statute covered only the mineral rights during that period,
and the only taxes assessed against the surface of the property were paid by the Reeds and their predecessors.

The

Reeds have thus satisfied the requirements for adverse possession under Utah law, and the district court's judgment
quieting title in them must be upheld.
In addition, Royal Street's action is barred by the seven
year statute of limitations.

The statute, read in context

with related statutes, clearly indicates an intention that it
apply to record owners of property.

While Royal Street's
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record ownership entitles it to a presumption of possession,
that presumption was rebutted in the instant case by unchallenged facts which clearly demonstrate that the Reeds and
their predecessors have openly and actually possessed the
property without interference for over fifty years preceding
Royal Street's initiation of this action.
DATED this /U

day of March, 1984.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEiq & MARTINEAU
By
Joseph Noyaw, of Counsel
Stephen Roth
Rodney R. Parker
Attorneys for Respondents
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